READ THE WHOLE ARTICLE
Like in many other emerging technologies, security threats can target the unprotected wireless channel used between RFID readers and tags to exchange information. We present a practical eavesdropping attack to capture control data exchanged between a standard EPC Gen2 reader and a series of EPC Gen2 tags. We assume that the attacker can only access to the spectrum channel that contains the set of queries generated by the reader, that is, the reader-to-tag channel. We show that, even if the security model of the EPC Gen2 standard allows to capture this data, it contains information generated by the on-board components of the tags, that shall remain secret to guarantee the security properties of an EPC Gen2 network. We base our attack on a programmable RFID toolkit, that silently captures and stores reader interrogations…
BY JOAQUIN GARCIA-ALFARO, JORDI HERRERA-JOANCOMARTI, JOAN MELIA-SEGUI
Please keep in mind that comments are moderated and
rel="nofollow" is in use. So, please do not use a spammy keyword or a domain as your name, or it will be deleted. Let us have a personal and meaningful conversation instead.
You must be logged in to post a comment.